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Abstract
Collapse theories are versions of quantum mechanics according to which the
collapse of the wave function is a real physical process. They propose precise
mathematical laws to govern this process and to replace the vague conventional
prescription that a collapse occurs whenever an “observer” makes a “measure-
ment.” The “primitive ontology” of a theory (more or less what Bell called the
“local beables”) are the variables in the theory that represent matter in space-
time. There is no consensus about whether collapse theories need to introduce a
primitive ontology as part of their definition. I make some remarks on this ques-
tion and point out that certain paradoxes about collapse theories are absent if a
primitive ontology is introduced.
Key words: quantum theory without observers; Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber (GRW)
theory of spontaneous wave function collapse; primitive ontology; local beables;
quantum measurement problem; mind-body problem.
1 Introduction
Although collapse theories (Ghirardi, 2007) have been invented to overcome the para-
doxes of orthodox quantum mechanics, several authors have set up similar paradoxes in
collapse theories. I argue here, following Monton (2004), that these paradoxes evapo-
rate as soon as a clear choice of the primitive ontology is introduced, such as the flash
ontology or the matter density ontology. In addition, I give a broader discussion of the
concept of primitive ontology, what it means and what it is good for.
According to collapse theories of quantum mechanics, such as the Ghirardi–Rimini–
Weber (GRW) theory (Ghirardi et al., 1986; Bell, 1987a) or similar ones (Pearle, 1989;
Dio´si, 1989; Bassi and Ghirardi, 2003), the time evolution of the wave function ψ in our
world is not unitary but instead stochastic and non-linear; and the Schro¨dinger equation
∗Department of Mathematics, Rutgers University, Hill Center, 110 Frelinghuysen Road, Piscataway,
NJ 08854-8019, USA. E-mail: tumulka@math.rutgers.edu
1
is merely an approximation, valid for systems of few particles but not for macroscopic
systems, i.e., systems with (say) 1023 or more particles. The time evolution law for ψ
provided by the GRW theory is formulated mathematically as a stochastic process, see,
e.g., (Bell, 1987a; Bassi and Ghirardi, 2003; Allori et al., 2008), and can be summarized
by saying that the wave function ψ of all the N particles in the universe evolves as
if somebody outside the universe made, at random times with rate Nλ, an unsharp
quantum measurement of the position observable of a randomly chosen particle. “Rate
Nλ” means that the probability of an event in time dt is equal to Nλdt; λ is a constant
of order 10−15 sec−1. It turns out that the empirical predictions of the GRW theory
agree with the rules of standard quantum mechanics up to deviations that are so small
that they cannot be detected with current technology (Bassi and Ghirardi, 2003; Adler,
2007; Feldmann and Tumulka, 2012; Bassi and Ulbricht, 2014; Carlesso et al., 2016).
The merit of collapse theories, also known as dynamical state reduction theories, is
that they are “quantum theories without observers” (Goldstein, 1998), as they can be
formulated in a precise way without reference to “observers” or “measurements,” al-
though any such theory had been declared impossible by Bohr, Heisenberg, and others.
Collapse theories are not afflicted with the vagueness, imprecision, and lack of clarity of
ordinary, orthodox quantum mechanics (OQM). Apart from the seminal contributions by
Ghirardi et al. (1986); Bell (1987a); Pearle (1989); Dio´si (1989, 1990), and a precursor by
Gisin (1984), collapse theories have also been considered by Gisin and Percival (1993);
Leggett (2002); Penrose (2000); Adler (2007); Weinberg (2012), among others. A feature
that makes collapse models particularly interesting is that they possess extensions to
relativistic space-time that (unlike Bohmian mechanics) do not require a preferred fo-
liation of space-time into spacelike hypersurfaces (Tumulka, 2006a,b; Bedingham et al.,
2014); see Maudlin (2011) for a discussion of this aspect.
Collapse theories have been understood in two very different ways: some authors
[e.g., Bell (1987a); Ghirardi et al. (1995); Goldstein (1998); Maudlin (2007); Allori et al.
(2008); Esfeld (2014)] think that a complete specification of a collapse theory requires,
besides the evolution law for ψ, a specification of variables describing the distribution of
matter in space and time (called the primitive ontology or PO), while other authors [e.g.,
Albert and Loewer (1990); Shimony (1990); Lewis (1995); Penrose (2000); Adler (2007);
Pearle (2009); Albert (2015)] think that a further postulate about the PO is unnecessary
for collapse theories. The goals of this paper are to discuss some aspects of these two
views, to illustrate the concept of PO, and to convey something about its meaning and
relevance. I begin by explaining some more what is meant by ontology (Section 2) and
primitive ontology (Section 3). Then (Section 4), I discuss three paradoxes about GRW
from the point of view of PO. In Section 5, I turn to a broader discussion of PO. Finally
in Section 6, I describe specifically its relation to the mind-body problem.
2 Ontology and Its Relevance to Physics
The “ontology” of a theory means what exists, according to that theory. John S. Bell
(1976) coined the word “beables” (as opposed to observables) for the variables represent-
2
ing something real, according to that theory; that is, for the ontology. Many researchers,
physicists as well as philosophers, find it hard to think in terms of an ontology, partly
because we all have practiced for many years to think “in the quantum mechanical way.”
Physicist Jeremy Bernstein (2011) wrote:
Many of the papers I tried to read were written by philosophers and had
words like “ontology” sprinkled over them like paprika.
The quote conveys hesitation and reservations towards this word. I recommend that
physicists overcome this hesitation, as ontology is, in fact, a highly relevant concept.
And a very simple one. Despite the fancy name, the concept of ontology is already
familiar from classical physics. For example, Newtonian mechanics talks about particles,
and macroscopic objects such as rocks and trees consist, according to Newtonian me-
chanics, of particles—so one says that the ontology of Newtonian mechanics is particles.
For another example, the electric field may at first appear as a mere calculational device
(if defined as the force that a unit charge would feel if placed at a certain location),
but later developments (specifically the realization that the electric and magnetic fields
can carry energy and momentum) convince us that the electric and magnetic fields are
something real. That is, the electric and magnetic fields are part of the ontology of
classical electrodynamics.
It was long thought that the key to clarity in QM was to avoid talking about ontology
and stick to operational statements. In my opinion, that thought has not paid off.
Sometimes, we want to talk about events that occurred before humans existed, and then
it seems particularly absurd to assume that facts only become definite when observed.
But even when we talk about laboratory experiments, it is hard to stick to operational
statements and hard to avoid talking about what actually happened in reality. And
about that, OQM has only contradictory and unclear statements to offer. The true key
to clarity is to set up a hypothesis about what happens in reality, to analyze what the
consequences will be if that hypothesis is taken seriously, and to reject the hypothesis if it
leads to empirically incorrect consequences. It was long thought that such hypotheses do
not exist for QM, but Bohmian mechanics and collapse theories are counter-examples to
that thought. Bohmian mechanics nicely illustrates some advantages of a clear ontology:
• The theory can be stated in full on a single page (whereas operational statements
are cumbersome to formulate with high precision).
• The usual quantum rules about the probabilities of outcomes of experiments can
be derived as theorems instead of being postulated as axioms (Du¨rr et al., 2004).
• Paradoxes can be resolved simply by taking seriously the fundamental laws of the
theory. For example, Bell (1980) analyzed how Wheeler’s delayed-choice paradox
gets resolved in Bohmian mechanics.
• Symmetries (such as Lorentz or Galilean invariance or time reversal invariance or
gauge invariance) have a clear meaning and can be derived as theorems (Allori et al.,
2008). Likewise for superselection rules (Colin et al., 2006).
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3 Primitive Ontology in Collapse Theories
Primitive ontology (PO) is a name for that part of the ontology that represents matter in
3+1-dimensional space-time. For example, the PO in classical mechanics and Bohmian
mechanics are the particles (material points), mathematically represented by their world
lines and thus by their coordinate functions Qk(t) (the position of particle k at time t).
The wave function in Bohmian mechanics is part of the ontology (it is something real)
but not part of the primitive ontology (as it lives in configuration space, not in physical
space).
Bell (1976, 1987a) used the expression “local beables” for the variables representing
something real (“beables”) associated with a space-time point (“local”). For example,
in Bohmian mechanics, ψ is non-local because it refers to several space-time points at
once, whereas Qk(t) (or, equivalently, the number of actual particles at the space-time
point (x, y, z, t)) is a local beable. In all theories that I will consider here, the local
beables are exactly the primitive ontology (even though it may not necessarily be so in
all conceivable theories).
In collapse theories, I will focus on two particular choices of PO for the GRW theory,
the flash ontology and the matter density ontology. According to the flash ontology
(Bell, 1987a), matter is fundamentally described by a discrete set of space-time points
called flashes. Flashes are material space-time points. In the GRW theory with the
flash ontology (GRWf for short), there is one flash for each collapse of ψ; its time is
the time of the collapse, and its position is the collapse center; see, e.g., (Bell, 1987a;
Allori et al., 2008) for mathematical descriptions.
According to the matter density ontology (Ghirardi et al., 1995; Goldstein, 1998),
matter is fundamentally continuously distributed and described by a density func-
tion m(x, y, z, t) on space-time. In the GRW theory with the matter density ontology
(GRWm for short), the m function at time t is obtained from |ψt|
2 (which is a density
function on 3N -dimensional configuration space) by integrating out the coordinates of
N − 1 particles to get a 3-dimensional density function; in order not to prefer any par-
ticle, one averages over all sets of N − 1 particles (perhaps using a weighted average
with the particles’ masses as weights). See, e.g., (Allori et al., 2008) for a mathematical
description.
The view with which to contrast GRWf and GRWm is that there is no primitive
ontology, in fact no ontology at all in physical 3-space, and that the ontology comprises
only ψ (GRW∅ for short). To illustrate the difference between GRWf/GRWm and
GRW∅, let me make up a creation myth (as a metaphorical way of speaking): Suppose
God wants to create a universe governed by GRW theory. He creates a wave function ψ
of the universe that starts out as a particular ψ0 that he chose and evolves stochastically
according to a particular version of the GRW time evolution law. According to GRW∅,
God is now done. According to GRWf and GRWm, however, a second act of creation
is necessary, in which he creates the matter, i.e., either the flashes or continously dis-
tributed matter with density m, in both cases coupled to ψ by the appropriate laws. (I
will elaborate on this point in Section 5.2.)
There are several motivations for considering GRW∅. First, it seems more parsi-
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monious than GRWm or GRWf. Second, it was part of the motivation behind GRW
theory to avoid introducing an ontology in additon to ψ; otherwise, we may think, we
could have used Bohmian mechanics. In fact, much of the motivation came from the
measurement problem of OQM. The measurement problem arises from treating the mea-
surement apparatus as a quantum system (because it consists of electrons and quarks):
If the time evolution law for every wave function is linear, then the joint wave function
of object and apparatus after a quantum measurement is a non-trivial superposition
of states corresponding to different outcomes (except if the object was initially in an
eigenstate of the observable measured). If there are no variables in addition to the wave
function, then there is no fact about which outcome was the actual one. Thus, if there
is an actual outcome then we must either abandon the linearity of the Schro¨dinger evo-
lution or introduce further ontology in addition to ψ; this is the measurement problem.
The GRW theory was intended to choose the first option, not the second. And yet, I
think that GRW∅ is not an acceptable theory but GRWm and GRWf are.
In the next section, I will exemplify some issues by means of some paradoxes that
have been raised as objections to the GRW theory; I will describe what these paradoxes
look like from the point of view of a theory with PO, and will point out some advantages
of the PO view by showing that it resolves these paradoxes. In the section after that, I
will discuss the need for a primitive ontology more broadly.
4 Three Paradoxes About GRW Theories
In each case, I will first describe a paradox and then explain why it evaporates in GRWf
and GRWm. For GRWm, some of the relevant points have already been made by
Monton (2004).
4.1 Paradox 1: Does the Measurement Problem Persist?
Paradox: Here is a reason why one might think that the GRW theory fails to solve
the measurement problem (Albert and Loewer, 1990). Consider a quantum state like
Schro¨dinger’s cat, namely a superposition
ψ = c1ψ1 + c2ψ2 (1)
of two macroscopically distinct states ψi with ‖ψ1‖ = 1 = ‖ψ2‖, such that both contri-
butions have nonzero coefficients ci. Given that there is a problem—the measurement
problem—in the case in which the coefficients are equal, one should also think that there
is a problem in the case in which the coefficients are not exactly equal, but roughly of
the same size. One might say that the reason why there is a problem is that, according
to quantum mechanics, there is a superposition whereas according to our intuition there
should be a definite state. But then it is hard to see how this problem should go away
just because c2 is much smaller than c1. How small would c2 have to be for the problem
to disappear? No matter if c2 = c1 or c2 = c1/100 or c2 = 10
−100c1, in each case both
contributions are there. But the only relevant effect of the GRW process replacing the
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unitary evolution, as far as Schro¨dinger’s cat is concerned, is to randomly make one of
the coefficients much smaller than the other (although it also affects the shape of the
suppressed contribution (Wallace, 2014)).
Answer: The argument indeed raises questions about GRW∅. From the point of
view of GRWm or GRWf, however, the argument is flawed as it pays no attention to
the PO. To take the PO seriously means that whether Schro¨dinger’s cat is really dead
must be read off from the PO.
In GRWf, if |c2| ≪ |c1| then the next flash is overwhelmingly likely to be associated
with ψ1 (say, ψ1 = |dead〉), and so on for further flashes, with the result that the flashes
form the shape of a dead cat. They form this shape even if there are a few extra
flashes associated with |alive〉, but in fact, since each flash associated with a collapse
favoring |dead〉 further reduces the probability of a flash associated with |alive〉, it has
probability near 1, given that |c2| ≪ |c1|, that the number of later flashes associated
with ψ2 = |alive〉 is zero. So yes, the wave function is still a superposition, but the
definite facts that our intuition wants can be found in the PO. The flashes represent
reality in 4-dimensional space-time; the cat is in the flashes, not in ψ. To be sure, we
have no precise definition of which patterns of flashes should be regarded as dead cats;
that fact, however, is not worrisome; it arises simply because the words “dead cat” are
not precisely defined in ordinary language.
In GRWm, if ψ is close to |dead〉 thenm equalsm|dead〉 up to a small perturbation, and
that can reasonably be accepted as the PO of a dead cat. Note the following: Whereas
the wave function is a superposition of two packets ψ1, ψ2 that correspond to two very
different kinds of (particle) configurations in ordinary QM or Bohmian mechanics, there
is only one configuration of the matter density m—the definite fact that our intuition
wants. A subtlety here arises from the fact that the small contribution to m that comes
from ψ2 often still has internal structure (say, looks like a live cat); I will address this
point in Section 5.4 below.
4.2 Paradox 2: How Can You Call a Cat Dead if There is a
Small Probability of Finding it Alive?
Paradox: As a variant of the first paradox, one might say that even after the GRW
collapses have pushed |c1|
2 near 1 and |c2|
2 near 0 in the state vector (1), there is still
a positive probability |c2|
2 that if we make a “quantum measurement” of the macro-
state—of whether the cat is dead or alive—we will find the state ψ2, even though the
GRW state vector has collapsed to a state vector near ψ1, a state vector that might be
taken to indicate that the cat is really dead (assuming ψ1 = |dead〉). Thus, it seems not
justified to say that, when ψ is close to |dead〉, the cat is really dead. This paradox is
another version of the “tail problem” (Shimony, 1990; Albert and Loewer, 1990; Lewis,
1995; Albert and Loewer, 1996; Cordero, 1999).
Answer: It is important here to appreciate the following difference between orthodox
quantum mechanics and GRWm/GRWf concerning the meaning of the wave function
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and how the wave function makes contact with our world: In orthodox quantum mechan-
ics, a system’s wave function governs the probabilities for the outcomes of experiments
on the system, whereas in GRWm/GRWf, the wave function governs the PO. This dif-
ference creates a difference concerning what one means when saying that the cat is
dead: In orthodox quantum mechanics, one means that if we made a “quantum mea-
surement” of the cat’s macro-state, we would with probability 1 find it dead, whereas
in GRWm/GRWf one means that the PO forms a dead cat. If the cat is dead in this
sense, in GRWm/GRWf, and ψ is close but not exactly equal to |dead〉, then there is
still a tiny but non-zero probability that within the next millisecond the collapses occur
in such a way that the cat is suddenly alive! But that does not contradict the claim
that a millisecond before the cat was dead; it only means that GRWm/GRWf allows
resurrections to occur—with tiny probability! In particular, if we observe the cat after
that millisecond, there is a positive probability that we find it alive (simply because it
is alive) even though before the millisecond it actually was dead.1
4.3 Paradox 3: Consider Many Systems
Paradox: A variant of the previous paradox was formulated by Lewis (1997) in terms of
counting marbles; the discussion continued in (Cordero, 1999; Clifton and Monton, 1999,
2000; Bassi and Ghirardi, 1999a,b, 2001; Frigg, 2003; Lewis, 2003, 2005, 2006; Monton,
2004; Wallace, 2008; Pearle, 2009; McQueen, 2015). Let ψ1 be the state “the marble is
inside the box” and ψ2 the state “the marble is outside the box”; these wave functions
have disjoint supports S1, S2 in configuration space (i.e., wherever one is nonzero the
other is zero). Let ψ be given by (1) with 0 < |c2|
2 ≪ |c1|
2 < 1; finally, consider a
system of n (non-interacting) marbles at time t0, each with wave function ψ, so that
the wave function of the system is ψ⊗n. Then, for each of the marbles we would feel
entitled to say that it is inside the box, but on the other hand, the probability that all
marbles be found inside the box is |c1|
2n, which can be made arbitrarily small by making
n sufficiently large.
Answer: For GRWm it follows from the PO, as in the answer to the previous paradox,
that each of the marbles is inside the box at the initial time t0. However, it is known
that a superposition like (1) of macroscopically distinct states ψi will approach under
the GRW evolution either a wave function ψ1(∞) concentrated in S1 or another ψ2(∞)
in S2 with probabilities |c1|
2 and |c2|
2, respectively. (Here I am assuming H = 0 for
simplicity. Although both coefficients will still be nonzero after any finite number of
collapses, one of them will tend to zero in the limit t → ∞.) Thus, for large n the
wave function will approach one consisting of approximately n|c1|
2 factors ψ1(∞) and
n|c2|
2 factors ψ2(∞), so that ultimately about n|c1|
2 of the marbles will be inside and
about n|c2|
2 outside the box—independently of whether anybody observes them or not.
1For GRWf, I assume here that the reason why c2 is small lies in GRW collapses that have occurred
in the past. When that is not the case, for example when ψ is prepared to be (1) with small c2, the
situation in GRWf is yet different, as then there is no fact at the initial time from the PO as to whether
the cat is dead or is alive. This will play a role in the subsequent paradox.
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The occurrence of some factors ψ2(∞) at a later time provides another example of the
resurrection-type events mentioned above; they are unlikely but do occur, of course, if
we make n large enough.
The act of observation plays no role in the argument and can be taken to merely
record pre-existing macroscopic facts. To be sure, the physical interaction involved
in the act of observation may have an effect on the system, such as speeding up the
evolution from ψ towards either ψ1(∞) or ψ2(∞); but GRWm provides unambiguous
facts about the marbles also in the absence of observers.
In GRWf, the story is a little more involved. The fact that the answer depends on
the choice of PO illustrates again the relevance of the PO, as well as the necessity to
make the PO and its laws explicit. The story is more involved because the PO cannot
be considered at only one point in time t0 but needs to be considered over some time
interval (say a millisecond), and because it depends on randomness. First, if we assume
that the smallness of c2 is due to previous collapses centered inside the box, then the
flashes during the millisecond before t0 form n marbles inside the box. Thus, as in
GRWm, initially we have n marbles inside the box, of which n|c2|
2 will be outside the
box after a while.
Now consider the other case: that the smallness of c2 is not due to previous collapses,
but due to some other method of preparing ψ. Then we may have to consider only flashes
after t0. Consider first a single marble. Something improbable may already happen at
this stage; for example, all the flashes might occur outside the box. In that case we would
say that the marble is outside the box. As well, it might happen that half of the flashes
occur outside and half of them inside the box; in that case we would say that half of the
marble’s matter is located inside the box. The overwhelmingly probable case, of course,
is that more than 99% of the marble’s flashes occur inside the box, a case in which it is
reasonable to say that the marble is inside the box. Thus, if |c2|
2 ≪ |c1|
2 at time t0 then
in GRWf (unlike in GRWm) the marble is not necessarily (only very probably) inside
the box, provided the time interval we consider is the millisecond after t0. Now consider
n marbles, with n so big that |c1|
2n ≪ 1; then it is not probable any more that for all
marbles 99% of the flashes occur inside the box. Rather, the overwhelmingly probable
case is that for the majority of marbles 99% of the flashes occur inside the box (so that
one should say these marbles are inside), while for a few marbles a significant fraction
of flashes occurs outside, and for extremely few marbles even all flashes occur outside.
In the limit t → ∞, as a consequence of the convergence to either ψ1(∞) or ψ2(∞),
for each marble either almost all flashes occur inside the box or almost all flashes occur
outside.
4.4 What is Real and What is Accessible
Another remark concerns the reply by Bassi and Ghirardi (1999a,b, 2001) (also 2003,
Sec. 11) to the tail problem and the marble problem; see also (Monton, 2004). Bassi
and Ghirardi use GRWm but immediately focus on (what they call) the accessibility
of the matter density, i.e., on the fact that the matter density cannot be measured by
inhabitants of the GRWm world to arbitrary accuracy. In particular, they point out that
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for the marble wave function the matter density outside the box is not detectable. I think
that Bassi and Ghirardi took two steps at once, thereby making the argument harder
to understand for their readers, and that perhaps they did not take the PO seriously
enough. To the extent that the worry expressed in the above paradoxes (and by Shimony
(1990); Albert and Loewer (1990); Lewis (1997); Clifton and Monton (1999)) is whether
GRW theories do give rise to unambiguous facts about the aliveness of Schro¨dinger’s
cat or the location of the marble, it concerns whether GRW theories provide a picture
of reality that conforms with our everyday intuition. Such a worry cannot be answered
by pointing out what an observer can or cannot measure. Instead, I think, the answer
can only lie in what the ontology is like, not in what observers see of it. Moreover, I
think, it can only lie in what the primitive ontology is like, as that is the part of the
ontology representing “the cat” and “the marble.” It can easily cause confusion to blur
the distinction between what is real and what is accessible, as not everything that is real
and well-defined according to GRW theories is accessible; for example, the number of
collapses in a given time interval [t1, t2] is well-defined but cannot be measured reliably
(Cowan and Tumulka, 2014, 2016).
Now for the marble state considered above, it is a fact for the matter density ontology
that the fraction |c2|
2 ≪ 1 of the marble’s matter lies outside the box—a fact that does
not contradict the claim that the marble is inside the box, as can be illustrated by noting
that anyway, for thermodynamic reasons, the marble creates a vapor out of some of its
atoms (with low partial pressure), an effect typically outweighing |c2|
2. The state of
the PO in which the overwhelming majority of matter is inside the box justifies saying
that the marble is inside the box. Thus, the PO does provide a picture of reality that
conforms with our everyday intuition. All this is independent of whether the PO is
observable (accessible) or not. Bassi and Ghirardi sometimes sound as if they did not
take the matter density seriously when it is not accessible; I submit that the PO should
always be taken seriously.
The reason why Bassi and Ghirardi attribute such importance to whether the matter
density is accessible is presumably the following: If the matter density outside the box
could be measured to be nonzero then this would seem to threaten the claim that the
marble is inside. But the threat is actually not serious: For example, the vapor created
by the marble can in fact be measured to have nonzero density, but this fact does not
at all suggest that “the marble” should be regarded as being outside, it only suggests
(indeed, it entails) that a small part of the marble’s matter is outside the box.
5 The Need for a Primitive Ontology
In this section, I offer further considerations about the status and role of the PO.
5.1 Is There a Cat?
We all once learned OQM and got used to “quantum think”—certain ways of reasoning
employed in OQM. One of these ways of reasoning postulates that, whenever ψ is the
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wave function of a live cat,2 there is a live cat. Since collapse theories are not OQM,
these ways of reasoning need not apply, and this postulate is questionable. Bohmian
mechanics provides an example of a situation in which the PO could be in a configuration
of a live cat, and move with time in the manner of a live cat, while ψ is a non-trivial
superposition of a live cat and a dead cat. This example suggests that
it is appropriate to say “there is a live cat” when and only
when part of the PO behaves like a live cat.
(2)
In particular, whether there is a live cat depends on ψ only through the dependence of
the PO on ψ by virtue of the laws governing the PO. It then follows that there is no
live cat in GRW∅, because there is no PO, regardless of ψ. This is perhaps the most
fundamental problem about theories without a PO: It is hard to avoid the conclusion
that they imply the absence of matter in space-time.
Furthermore, (2) implies that there is a logical gap between saying
“ψ is the wave function of a live cat” (3)
and saying
“there is a live cat.” (4)
After all, in Bohmian mechanics, (4) follows from (3) by virtue of a law of the theory,
which asserts that the configuration Q(t) of the PO is |ψt|
2 distributed at every time
t. This law entails that if ψt is the wave function of a live cat, then Q(t) will be the
configuration of a live cat and will continue to behave like the configuration of a live cat
for t′ > t as long as ψt′ stays the wave function of a live cat. Thus, Bohmian mechanics
suggests that (4) would not follow from (3) if there was not a law connecting the two
by means of the PO.
An attractive feature of the PO view is that the word “cat” actually refers to a
thing : a set of particles in Bohmian mechanics, or a set of flashes in GRWf, or a
part of the continuous matter in GRWm that behaves like a cat under the influence
of ψ. Correspondingly, the statement “the cat is alive” simply means that that thing
behaves in a certain way—like a live cat. In GRW∅, in contrast, we need to assume
a re-interpretation of English phrases: We need to assume that the word “cat” does
not refer to any thing, and that the phrase “the cat is alive” does not summarize the
behavior of a thing called “the cat,” but rather that this phrase really means (3). I find
that hard to swallow.
Despite all this, there is a sense in which GRW∅ works: The GRWwave function ψt is,
at almost all times, concentrated, except for tiny tails, on a set of configurations that are
macroscopically equivalent to each other. Thus, we can read off from ψt what the macro-
state is: For example, we could pretend there were particles whose configuration Q is
|ψt|
2 distributed, and consider the macroscopic appearance of Q. Alternatively, we could
compute m(x, y, z, t) and consider its macroscopic appearance. Some thought reveals
2I.e., a wave function concentrated in a certain region of configuration space, and with energies of
certain subsystems in suitable ranges, etc..
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that the macroscopic appearance of Q agrees (with high probability) with that ofm [and
in fact with that of the flashes in GRWf (Goldstein et al., 2012); but see also (Sebens,
2015)]; for example, they agree about which way the pointer of a measurement instru-
ment points. So ψt contains all the information about what the macro-configuration
would look like, if there were any matter that could have this macro-configuration. This
fact explains why GRW∅ provides enough information to read off empirical predicitions,
although they are, in fact, the empirical predictions of GRWf and GRWm, and not those
of GRW∅.
Actually, while GRWf and GRWm are empirically equivalent in the sense that there is
no experiment that could test one against the other, their macro-configurations of the PO
can differ if the parameters (i.e., constants of nature) of the GRW time evolution (i.e., the
collapse width σ and the collapse rate λ) are chosen in extreme ways. This became visible
in (Feldmann and Tumulka, 2012), where we drew a parameter diagram with axes σ and
λ for the GRW theories and therein the empirically refuted region and the philosophically
unsatisfactory region: it turned out that the latter region is different for GRWf than
for GRWm if based on the following definition: “We regard a parameter choice (σ, λ)
as philosophically satisfactory if and only if the PO agrees on the macroscopic scale
with what humans normally think macroscopic reality is like.” (Feldmann and Tumulka,
2012) (But see also (Sebens, 2015) for a further subtlety about the two regions.)
I remark that an issue parallel to GRW∅ versus GRWm/GRWf comes up in many-
worlds theories. The most popular understanding of many-worlds is that there is only
the wave function ψ which evolves according to the linear Schro¨dinger equation. The
theory actually becomes clearer if one introduces a suitable PO; an example is provided
by Schro¨dinger’s many-worlds theory (Allori et al., 2011).
5.2 All Observables?
Pearle (2009) suggested, instead of GRWm, the view that every observable Aˆ is at-
tributed as a “true value” the value that in OQM would be the average of Aˆ in the state
ψt,
A(t) = 〈ψt|Aˆ|ψt〉 , (5)
and that the m(x, y, z, t) function of GRWm is just the special case for Aˆ = Mˆ(x, y, z)
the mass density operator, which in the position representation of non-relativistic QM
of N particles is multiplication by the function
N∑
i=1
mi δ(xi − x) δ(yi − y) δ(zi − z) . (6)
To contrast this view with GRWm, let me use the creation myth again that I mentioned
in Section 3 above: For creating a GRWm world, God would need two acts of creation,
one for creating ψ and one for creating the matter with density m(x, y, z, t). For creating
a world according to Pearle’s view, would God just have to create ψ, or would he have
to carry out a separate act of creation for every observable Aˆ? Let us compare the
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situation to the status of energy in a Newtonian universe. If God wants to create
a Newtonian universe, he needs to create point particles that move according to the
Newtonian equation of motion,
mi
d2Qi(t)
dt2
= −∇iV
(
Q1(t), . . . ,QN(t)
)
(7)
for a suitable potential V . Then energy is defined as
E(t) =
∑
i
mi
2
∣∣∣dQi
dt
∣∣∣
2
+ V
(
Q1(t), . . . ,QN(t)
)
, (8)
and no separate act of creation is needed in which God would have to create energy
according to this equation. This situation suggests that likewise, no separate act of
creation is needed to introduce A(t). So Pearle’s suggestion is really a form of GRW∅,
notwithstanding the appearance that GRWm be contained in it.
Let me connect Pearle’s suggestion to empricial predictions. It is one of the key roles
of the PO that when deriving empirical predictions (“with probability p, the pointer will
be in position x”), we actually derive statements about the PO, as the pointer is where
its flashes/matter density/particles are. It is illuminating to see how this works out
in various theories with PO (Allori et al., 2014). In Pearle’s approach, in contrast, if
we use the m function to determine the pointer position, then this is just one among
many possibilities of defining what is meant by “pointer position.” Other possibilities
could be based on the flash ontology, or on taking Aˆ to be the center-of-mass position
operator of the particles forming the pointer. It is not clear, then, which choice would be
correct in case they disagree [and, as mentioned above, GRWf and GRWm sometimes
do disagree about the macro-configuration of the PO for extreme values of σ and λ
(Feldmann and Tumulka, 2012)]. But even when they agree, I find it unclear what
justifies these choices and prefers them over all other operators Aˆ. It seems within our
power to define which pieces of matter we call pointers, but not to define what is meant
by their position.
5.3 Paradoxes
The paradoxes of Section 4 also pose a problem for GRW∅. For example, consider
Paradox 1 again, the most basic one: After Schro¨dinger’s cat collapses to |alive〉, the
amplitude of |dead〉 is tiny but not exactly zero. What right then do we have to say that
the cat is alive? To solve this problem, Albert and Loewer (1996) have proposed a rule
under the name “fuzzy link” asserting that any observable Aˆ has value A whenever ψ
lies approximately in the eigenspace of Aˆ with eigenvalue A. Applying this rule to Aˆ the
projection to the space of wave functions of live cats yields that whenever the amplitude
of |dead〉 in a superposition of |alive〉 and |dead〉 is tiny, the cat is alive. The question
arises, however, why we would have the freedom to introduce a rule such as the fuzzy
link. When we formulate a fundamental physical theory, we have the freedom to posit
which things exist according to the theory (the ontology) and the laws governing them.
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For GRW∅, we would posit that ψ and only ψ exists, and that it evolves according to
the GRW process. It seems that there is no further room, then, for additional postulates
such as the fuzzy link. Of course, if we introduce further elements of the ontology, such
as a PO, then we can also postulate further laws governing the further ontology.
5.4 Worlds in the Tails
Another puzzle about the tails (Cordero, 1999; Wallace, 2008; Maudlin, 2010; McQueen,
2015; Egg and Esfeld, 2015) arises from the fact that in GRWm, there is some matter
that is governed by the tails of ψ: The m function has small ripples that follow the
evolution of suppressed parts of ψ, for example of a dead cat after 2−1/2(|dead〉+ |alive〉)
has collapsed to near |alive〉. Arguably, as in Schro¨dinger’s many-worlds theory with a
PO (Allori et al., 2011), this means that GRWm has a many-worlds character: Apart
from the live cat, there also exists a dead cat. In GRWf, in contrast, when the tails are
too small, there are no flashes associated with them, so that such further worlds do not
exist. In GRWm, one of the worlds is the “fat world” (associated with the bulk of the
matter), the others are the “faint worlds” (associated with the tails). I think we are
forced to admit that the faint worlds are real. As pointed out by Wallace (2014), the
faint worlds behave very differently than the fat world, in fact catastrophically, due to
the gradient in the Gaussian that gets multiplied onto ψ at every collapse. It seems that
the upshot is that GRWm predicts the existence of several worlds, the fat and the faint
ones, with very different behavior, and that we live in the fat world (as most observers
do, since observers do not survive for long in the faint worlds).
5.5 Lorentz Invariance
Another consideration concerns Lorentz invariance. Relativistic versions of GRWf and
GRWm have been developed (Tumulka, 2006a,b; Bedingham et al., 2014) for non-interacting
particles; relativistic collapse processes for ψ (albeit ultraviolet divergent) had been de-
veloped even earlier (Pearle, 1990; Dio´si, 1990). The flashes transform like space-time
points and the m function like a Lorentz scalar, while there is no simple relation be-
tween ψΣ and ψΛ(Σ) for spacelike hypersurfaces Σ and Lorentz transformations Λ. For
GRW∅, in contrast, it seems unsatisfactory to merely replace the GRW process by a
Lorentz invariant collapse process, for the following reason (Bedingham et al., 2014).
For a spacelike 3-surface Σ = A∪B with A∩B = ∅, the reduced density matrix of A is
ρˆA = trB|ψΣ〉〈ψΣ| . (9)
But this depends on B: For Σ′ = A∪B′, ψΣ′ may be very different from ψΣ due collapses
between Σ and Σ′, and ρˆ′A = trB′ |ψΣ′〉〈ψΣ′ | may be very different from ρˆA. For example,
if ψΣ = 2
−1/2(|↑↓〉 − |↓↑〉) is the spin-singlet state of an EPR pair and Bob’s particle
passes through a Stern–Gerlach magnet and collapses to either | ↑↓〉 or | ↓↑〉 before
reaching Σ′, then the reduced state on Alice’s side is ρˆA =
1
2
(|↑〉〈↑|+ |↓〉〈↓|) before the
collapse and either ρˆ′A = |↑〉〈↑| or ρˆ
′
A = |↓〉〈↓| afterward. Now, in GRW∅ we would have
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liked to read off the local state of affairs in region A from ψ, but the answer depends on
the choice of B or B′. However, local facts in region A should not depend whether we
consider B or B′! This problem is absent in GRWf and GRWm because, even though
reduced density matrices are still subject to the same ambiguity, the PO consists of local
variables (the flashes or matter density) and thus provides plenty of local facts, enough
for a meaningful physical theory. Albert (personal communication, 2014) has suggested
that for GRW∅, one could simply use a preferred foliation of space-time into spacelike
hypersurfaces. This would have the disadvantage of making GRW∅ less relativistic than
GRWf or GRWm, but the bigger problem with this suggestion is that, as with the fuzzy
link rule, there does not seem to be any room for further postulates (such as to use a
particular foliation for extracting local facts) after it has been stipulated that ψ evolves
according to a certain relativistic collapse law and that the ontology contains only ψ.
6 Connection to the Mind-Body Problem
The persistent disagreement between two camps, one maintaining that GRW∅ is an ac-
ceptable theory [e.g., Adler (2007); Albert (2015); Pearle (2009); Rimini], and the other
that a PO is needed [e.g., Allori (2013a,b, 2015a,b); Ghirardi et al. (1995); Bedingham et al.
(2014); Goldstein et al. (2012); Maudlin (2010, 2016)], is perhaps ultimately related to
different views about the mind-body problem. After a brief outline of this problem [for
a detailed description see, e.g., the first few chapters of (Chalmers, 1996)], I will explain
how it comes up in connection with requirements on fundamental physical theories (such
as, to have a PO).
6.1 What is the Mind-Body Problem?
The color red looks a particular way to me that I cannot express in words. I would guess
it looks the same way to other people, but I cannot really check (after all, it is logically
possible that things that look red to me, such as tomatoes, look blue to somebody else
and that we would never notice because that other person will call things red when
they look blue to her). “The way red looks” is the conscious experience of red, which
is different from the knowledge that the light that reached my eye had a wave length of
800 nanometers and is called “red” in English.
If we try to come up with an explanation of this experience, we encounter a problem:
A physical theory may claim that the particles in my brain follow certain trajectories, but
this claim would not explain the experience of red, regardless of what the trajectories are.
This is the essence of the mind-body problem, also sometimes called the “hard problem
of consciousness.” In contrast, all the information processing (from light of 800 nm
to the English word “red”) poses no obstacle in principle for an explanation in terms
of particle trajectories. (It is the “easy problem of consciousness.”) The mind-body
problem is not specific to particles, it would be the same with fields, wave functions, or
any other kind of physical object. Here, consciousness does not mean being awake, or
being aware, or knowing oneself; but seeing colors.
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To appreciate the problem, it may help to try to write a computer program that
makes the computer see red. That seems impossible. It is clearly possible that the
computer identifies data from a digital camera as corresponding to a wave length of 800
nanometers and to the English word “red.” However, for this information processing,
the computer need not see red, and by virtue of this information processing alone, the
computer does not see red.
However, there is no consensus about the mind-body problem. Functionalists think
that there is no such problem, and that there is nothing more to the mind than infor-
mation processing. I think there is a mind-body problem, and I do not see how it could
ever be solved, i.e., how conscious experiences could be reduced to physical processes. I
conclude that there are facts in the world beyond the physical facts.
6.2 How the Mind-Body Problem Affects Physics
A goal of a fundamental physical theory is to explain our experiences. In order to even
connect with our experiences, it may seem that the theory has to solve the mind-body
problem, which seems hopeless.
Luckily, there is a simple way out (as emphasized by Maudlin). Suppose the theory
implies the existence of macroscopic objects in 3-space in particular macroscopic con-
figurations. And suppose that we are not completely deluded about the world around
us, that instrument pointers actually point more or less the way we think, and that we
can usually read correctly. Then we can compare the predicted macro-configurations to
the perceived macro-configurations, and claim, in case of agreement, that the theory is
empirically adequate. It actually works like that in classical physics, and in any theory
with a primitive ontology.
Here is a passage from Maudlin (2016) in this direction:
A theory’s specification of the fermion density [as an example of a PO] in
every region of the universe entails the distribution of matter at macroscopic
scale. And if what it predicts at macroscopic scale matches everything we
think we know about the world at macroscopic scale (including where the
pointers ended up pointing, where the ink is on the paper, the shape of the
earth, the dimensions of the Empire State building, etc., etc., etc.) then
the theory is empirically adequate in any reasonable sense. There may be
objections to such a theory, but they cannot rightfully be called empirical
objections.
That is, physical theories with a PO do not need to solve the mind-body problem,
whereas theories without a PO seem to be stuck with this unsolvable problem. Thus,
physical theories are better off with a PO.
Acknowledgments. I thank David Albert, Eddy Chen, Shelly Goldstein, Ned Hall, Travis
Norsen, Philip Pearle, Antoine Tilloy, and Nino Zangh`ı for helpful discussions.
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